This is a water colour painting of a creeper wih beautiful pink flowers that bloom in autumn season in Assam and can be seen hanging from walls and fences of homes. Through vibrant colours of flowers and blooming in plentiful this creeper covers wide spaces turning an area into a spectacular sight for eyes.
Saturday, 28 May 2016
Tuesday, 24 May 2016
Saturday, 21 May 2016
Thursday, 19 May 2016
Wednesday, 18 May 2016
Shooting down of Pakistani Jet in Indo-Pak War of 1965
On 16 September 1965, as the air war
between India and Pakistan was raging on its 16th day, a young fighter
pilot from Indian Air Force (IAF) was able to draw first blood shooting down a
F 86 Sabre jet of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) from his British made Hawker Hunter
F 56. Indian pilot was Flying Officer (later Air Marshal) PS ‘Pingo’
Pingale and for him the sweet taste of victory was laced with larger
satisfaction of getting his scores even with PAF in a period of less than ten
days.
On 07 September 1965, Fg Offr Pingale while
flying a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) mission over Halwara, Punjab was shot at by a
PAF Sabre who had managed to creep in behind unnoticed and let go a
deadly volley of machine gun fire from point blank range on his Hunter fighter.
On looking back Pingale spotted his attacker behind and turned into him. But
his controls were sluggish and his cockpit was already getting filled with
smoke. He was left with no other option but to pull the ejection handle of his
Martin Baker seat as his aircraft was plummeting towards ground with mere 100
feet to go. He did survive the ejection but experienced a severe pain in the
lower back, a common injury that most fighter pilots suffer in an ejection. The
injury was serious enough for any pilot to be grounded for months on health
ground as another ejection during recovery period can either be fatal or result
in permanent injuries like complete paralysis from waist down. For Flying
Officer Pingale, spending the rest of the war lying on a hospital bed while his
squadron was fighting a war was unthinkable. There was also a burning desire in
his guts to get even with Pakis. Pingo managed to convince the doctors at Air
Force Central Medical Establishment (AFCME), New Delhi that he was fine and
fighting fit although he was nurturing a nagging pain in the lower back.
Very soon Pingo joined his squadron known as ‘Battleaxes” at Halwara. It
did not take too long for him to strap into a cockpit and fly a number of
interdiction missions deep in enemy territory. But while engaging targets on
ground his eyes constantly scanned the sky to find an enemy fighter to even out
his personal score with his enemy.
On 16 September 1965, that opportunity
arrived as the Hunter formation flown by him on an air defence mission
with Flying Officer FD Bunsha as his wingman was vectored by the
GCI station (ground radar) for an intercept on two enemy aircraft prowling in
Indian airspace at around 20,000 feet. Pingale’s made visual contact with one
Sabre approaching head on and from beneath. As he maneuvered his section to get
behind the Sabre it turned on a Southerly heading and carried on straight. It
appeared to him that the Sabre had not spotted the Hunters at this stage and
that helped the Hunters to steadily close in on the lone enemy. However, gut
feeling and months of air combat training kept telling Pingale to look for a
second enemy aircraft and on deepening his scan in the rear quarter he spotted
the second Sabre at 4 O’clock at approximately 800 yards rapidly
closing in and ready to fire. Pingale told less experienced Bunsha to
split and go for the enemy ahead as he turned on to face his adversary in rear
quarter. Pingale crossed the Sabre head on and reversed steeply to
engage him using the vertical plane, a tactics that was well suited for a
Hunter with a more powerful engine as compared to a Sabre. US made Sabre, on
the other hand, was an extremely well designed fighter for a dog fight
especially at low level and had an unviable record of almost 5:1 kill in favour
against Russian MiGs in Korean War. Its
six browning machine guns could fire an extremely lethal envelope of bullets
that could rip apart an aircraft to shreds. However, it lacked a powerful
engine. Combat advise to all Hunter pilots
was never to engage a Sabre in a turning plane as it can out turn any fighter
in the world at low level. Take the fight vertical and watch his performance
bleed owing to a less powerful engine and then close in for a kill, it said.
As combat with the Sabre progressed,
Pingale started gaining on his adversary forcing him to make series of errors
that helped him to close in further and open fire with his four 30 mm cannons
spewing bullets at 1200 to 1300 rounds per minute. First burst was from 400
yards but missed as aiming with a gyro gunsight required steady tracking
for few seconds and in the excitement of the battle Pingale’s aiming had gone
wild. But soon training took over and he settled down for his second shot from
200-250 yards with proper ranging and tracking. The correct aiming index in a
dog fight is always the opponent’s cockpit which ensures a sure kill. For
the second salvo of bullets, Pingale had pipper of his gunsight perfectly
resting on the Sabres’ cockpit He eased back the pipper a bit behind the
cockpit hoping the rounds would not hit the pilot and pressed the trigger for
the second time and watched the Pakistani jet literally explode in front him.
(My painting tried to capture on canvas the
precise moment Fg Offr Pingale releases the trigger as the Sabre is about
to explode in front at probably 150 yds from him)
Pakistani pilot was young Flying
Officer Shaukat Ali, who managed to eject unaware that a fellow pilot’s
benevolence had saved his life. Shaukat spent rest of the war in an Indian POW
camp.
While combating with his Sabre,
Pingale had noticed Bunsha gradually loosing his hold in his battle with the
first Sabre and warned him to be careful. But to his dismay, he saw the
Pakistani getting better of Bunsha and Hunter going down spewing smoke. He
yelled at Bunsha to eject but there was no response from Bunsha’s aircraft as
it continued to go down. By now Pingale’s Sabre was a ball of flame and he
instantly put his Hunter in a turn towards the Sabre who had continued to fire
at the stricken aircraft of Bunsha. Bunsha did not to eject as cannons shells
from Pakistani pilot seemed to kill him instantly. As Pingale turned
into Sabre on Bunsha’s tail, it gave up firing and turned sharply to face him.
Both aircraft crossed head on at high speed and Pingale immediately reversed
hauling the Hunter around half expecting to find the Sabre doing the same. But
he was in for surprise. The Sabre choose to fly away at high speed from the
fight on a homebound course. An indignant Pingale gave chase diving steeply
with an aim to close in behind the running Sabre. As ground rushed in Pingale
pulled hard to recover from his steep dive he was in and immediately
felt a shearing pain from his back injury suffered during his recent
ejection. High ‘g’ force also blacked him out
completely. As he was recovering his wits about, the Sabre made a clean get
away. Later it was confirmed that one who got away was none other
than ace of ace of Pakistani Air Force, Squadron Leader MM Alam. Alam claimed
both the Hunters, Bunsha with guns and Pingale with a Sidewinder AAM..and
Pakistan Air Force obliged its hero with two more Hunters to his credit.
Satisfied at shooting down of a Sabre and
sad at losing Bunsha, Pingale flew back to his base under radar cover. Back at
the base his gun camera footage was analysed to grant him the kill of Flying
Officer Shaukat Ali’s aircraft and that earned him a Vir Chakra.
Friday, 13 May 2016
An IAF MiG-21 firing a K-13 AAM over the sea of Saurashtra.
Gnat Vs Sabre : clash of the titans
FIRST AIR BATTLE POST KOREAN WAR
Manna Murdeshwar
When
dawn unfolded on the morning of 1st Sept, 1965, on the Green Fields
of Ambala airport, we of No. 23 Sqn. AF
did not realize what was in store for us.
The “buchi woochies” ( hairy caterpillars) of Green Fields had crept
onto our flying overalls and ‘g’ suits and we were busy brushing these off when
word was transmitted to detach 4 Gnats to Halwara for ORP duties. ORP
duties were routine in those days, so not many eyebrows were raised. Sikand, Pat, Gill and Kitcha were accordingly
instructed “to get there!”
On
2nd Sept, 65 at about 1000 hrs, instructions received from WAC named
Johnny Greene, Manna Murdeshwar, AJS Sandhu and Trevor Keelor to fly four armed Gnats to Pathankot. Johnny and Sandhu, thus became attached to
No. 23 Sqn. We took off in the afternoon
of the same day in a low level abreast formation .
We
landed at Pathankot, at sunset and while taxiing to the dispersal I was greeted
by dejected and sad looking faces of course mates & others standing
alongside the taxiway. It was only when
we all walked out to the Technical Area, that we learnt of the four Vampires
that had been shot down on their attempt
to neutralise the large scale Pak Army’s thrust towards Akhnoor.
We were unaware of this major Pak operation and the consequence of
Indian Army’s SOS to the IAF for air support that resulted in the rather
misguided deployment of the ineffective Vampires from Pune. This , if I may call it, was a foolish
endeavour, as it resulted in the loss of
four Vampires and three pilots (one
bailed out). The apparent intention of the
Pak Army was to make a rapid thrust from
the Chamb-Jauhria sector to the Akhnoor bridge, thereby cutting off J & K State from India. The unfortunate decision of deploying
Vampires against well- armed Pak forces
was a reflection of the poor analysis and decision making abilities of our
then, rather naive leadership.
When
we assembled at the temporary makeshift office given to us, we were pleasantly
surprised to find Sikand and his team also present. On their landing at Halwara, they were
redirected to Pathankot. Thus, there
were eight of us comprising the No. 23 Sqn. Dett. Sikand, though senior most, realised he was
not an experienced combat pilot and therefore graciously asked Johnny to become
the leader of the Dett..
The so called brief given to us on 02 Sept late evening, was only to
develop any suitable tactics that would result in at least one Sabre
casualty. Two Mystere Squadrons based at Pathankot could also be
included to evolve any tactics that would yield the desired results. Johnny
with the concurrence of the Mysteres’ Commanders
drew out a plan that would draw the Sabres onto the Mysteres flying at about 20,000
ft. whence they would paint on the Pak radar. The Gnats at tree top heights,
would then climb up to engage the Sabres. That would be the indication for the
Mysteres to swoop low and return to base.
On
completion of the plans, we trudged along to the Officers’ Mess where we learnt
that no rooms were available for us. It
was already about 2130 hrs so we had our dinner, pulled a few charpoys outside a room and slept in our flying overalls. At about 3 am we were woken up, and clutching our flying gear, sleepily trudged along to the dispersal with
no vehicle, bearer, or tea in sight! “Wheels up” was scheduled at 0600 hrs. After the Met briefing, all eight of us taxied
out and waited for the Mysteres to get air borne. We then took off in
formations, fully armed with guns and drop tanks to cater for the low level flight
and air combat, that was likely to ensue.
It
must be appreciated that the Pak radar was far superior to ours. While the
Sabres were always within sight of Pak radars, our 230 SU at Amritsar
and the 501 SU at Barnala, were not as efficient to control and guide or warn us
of any threat that could develop.
As we arrived at the Chamb sector, the Mysteres at height, were picked
up by Pak radar and as foreseen the
Sabres arrived to meet them. At 501 SU’s
warning, the Mysteres, dropped height and both our Gnat formations moved up to engage the Sabres.
We were in a finger four a/c formation, led by Johnny and self, as
No.2, Sikand No.3 & Pat No.4. The rear formation were spread out abreast,
as normally done, led by Trevor, with No,2 Gill, No.3 Sandhu, & No.4 Kitcha.
In the combat that followed, a
lone Sabre was spotted behind me prompting Trevor to call a starboard ‘break’. Siki,
unable to maintain position, fell
off, and disappeared from sight. Pat, who also ‘got out of phase’, spotted a F104
& turned into him hoping for a possible engagement, but without success.
Both Johnny's & my ‘ break’ made the Sabre fall out, placing it in front of
Trevor who successfully fired at the Sabre. Sandhu who followed, also fired a few more shots, for luck!
Johnny & I landed together, with
Pat & the rest following at intervals. Siki unfortunately was not with us
and we learnt later that he had landed in Pakistan. That brought to a close the
first day's air battle.
The shooting down of a Sabre brought
much joy to WAC. Trevor was recommended for a Vr.C which was promptly announced in the evening’s News
Bulletin over All India Radio. ( But much after the hostilities were over, we
learnt that the ‘shot down Sabre’ had purportedly, landed at its base full of
bullet holes). Nevertheless, it was a
memorable air battle and the kudos were rightly earned, since it raised the
morale of the Service and the country!
(As an aside I would like to
state that the late AVM Johnny Greene Vr.C., did not receive all the credit he
deserved. To my mind he was one of the top combat pilots that I have had the opportunity to fly with. Not only was he an excellent
flyer but also a good combat instructor who could explain and demonstrate each manoeuvre very lucidly.
I was fortunate to learn more about combat flying from him at the mini DFLS
Course, he conducted at Ambala. God bless his soul.)
(I
would also like to place on record that I had the occasion to engage in a
couple of more air to air combats with the PAF Sabres. Without holding back any
punches, let me state that I developed a professional respect for the PAF
pilots’ flying abilities. On both my
engagements with them, they were initially in an advantageous position. But as
they lost the advantage during the gradual descent to lower heights, they
managed to ‘notch a flap’, half roll
& rapidly disappear. We, in the
Gnats, devoid of flaps, could not half roll at those heights, thereby remaining
at a disadvantage.)
Attack on Tiger Hill : Kargil Ops 1999
This is my
painting on attack of Tiger Hill by Mirage 2000 of Indian Air Force (IAF) with Laser Guided Bomb (LGB). The painting has
been composed purely on my visualisation of the attack after some detailed
discussions with officers that planned and executed this daring operation that
will certainly go down in records as exemplary integration of ideas and efforts
by pilots and engineers of IAF to achieve brilliance in time of actual
operation.
I do not
know if I can reveal all that I know on integration of the LDP with the weapon
and with weapon delivery system of Mirage 2000 that was so vital for success of
the mission. Few of my good friends who were test pilots in IAF and now retired
had assisted me with the facts with a request to record the event on canvas. As
I am not at all familiar with a Mirage 2000 it took me almost two years to get
the photographs of the trainer aircraft
with the actual configuration (LDP +LGB+Remora+ Magic 2+ Wing Tanks). CO 7 Sqn
was quite generous with his help. I also bought a scale model of a Mirage
trainer to plan my composition.
I am sure
those of you that have flown Mirage 2000 or have worked on ground may find
quite a few mistakes/errors in the painting. I will be grateful if such errors
can be pointed out. The paint is still wet and all minor of major defects can
be attended to with minimum hassel.
Finally, on
the sortie itself, what can be better than a narrative provided by the pilot
himself. A write-up on the attack by AVM R Nambiar, which is available in
public domain, is attached. To me it was one of the “Finest Hour of IAF
History”. I also must add that I have read a blog by a PAF historian Air Cmde
Kaiser Taufail (Retd) and he says that use of LGB by Mirages was the actual
game changer.
From Air
Mshl Bhojwani
Initially WAC
started with 57mm rockets fired by Type 96 and MiG27s, but these had virtually
no effect - the cine films showed these weapons to hit the hill
side/valley and their blast getting blanketed by the snow! They were terribly
inaccurate too because after our Canberra was hit by a Stinger (21st May 99) we
had to keep a minimum vertical separation of about 5000 ft between the aircraft
and the hill tops (which themselves were about 20,000 ft
amsl). No one had fired RPs at that altitude and so the errors were
large. We then tried S24s, but these also didn't prove successful, and at
least one MiG27 suffered a flame out as a result of firing this weapon, which
had been cleared by the Russians only up to 5km amsl.
It was in these circumstances in late May 99 that the idea of using LGBs from Mirage 2000 came to my mind. However, having followed the trials being done at ASTE, with help from the Israeli team, for integrating the new LDP on Mirage, I knew that the team had gone back to Israel for the summer with the trials having been left half undone. Nevertheless, the CAS jumped at the idea and asked for immediate completion of the trials. You can imagine the amount of work that everyone at Bangalore and Gwalior had to put in to complete the task. As you are aware, the Mirage systems are digitally interfaced and integrated very closely indeed. Unlike earlier generation of aircraft, even if a weapon could physically fit on the Mirage hard point, the computer will not accept it There would therefore be serious problems in flying the aircraft in such an un-programmed configuration. For instance, the FBW system would not recognise the weapon, nor make the necessary adjustments to the control laws to keep the aircraft (artificially) stable, nor allow release of such a weapon. I think our TPs, engineering and logistics people did a great job in mating the LDP and bomb and 'fooling' the Digicomp into believing the 1000lb bomb (with LGB kit) was a 'valid' weapon. Even when the aircraft was cleared for the task about 20 days later, there a few minor tweaks left over to make the system work 100%, but it was decided to use it anyway. The fact that the system worked well enough to achieve the end result was a credit to all the guys who worked behind the scenes and flew the missions. I don't think the IAF really gave recognition to all the brilliant people who made it happen.
It was in these circumstances in late May 99 that the idea of using LGBs from Mirage 2000 came to my mind. However, having followed the trials being done at ASTE, with help from the Israeli team, for integrating the new LDP on Mirage, I knew that the team had gone back to Israel for the summer with the trials having been left half undone. Nevertheless, the CAS jumped at the idea and asked for immediate completion of the trials. You can imagine the amount of work that everyone at Bangalore and Gwalior had to put in to complete the task. As you are aware, the Mirage systems are digitally interfaced and integrated very closely indeed. Unlike earlier generation of aircraft, even if a weapon could physically fit on the Mirage hard point, the computer will not accept it There would therefore be serious problems in flying the aircraft in such an un-programmed configuration. For instance, the FBW system would not recognise the weapon, nor make the necessary adjustments to the control laws to keep the aircraft (artificially) stable, nor allow release of such a weapon. I think our TPs, engineering and logistics people did a great job in mating the LDP and bomb and 'fooling' the Digicomp into believing the 1000lb bomb (with LGB kit) was a 'valid' weapon. Even when the aircraft was cleared for the task about 20 days later, there a few minor tweaks left over to make the system work 100%, but it was decided to use it anyway. The fact that the system worked well enough to achieve the end result was a credit to all the guys who worked behind the scenes and flew the missions. I don't think the IAF really gave recognition to all the brilliant people who made it happen.
Vampires over Chamb – Indo Pak War 1965
This is one of series of paintings
that I am doing in an attempt to recreate some of the major encounters of
Indian Air Force in Indo-Pak War of 195.
This
painting is about the very first day IAF was called into action to blunt a
massive armoured thrust across the IB by the Pakistani Army on 01 September
1965 code named “Operation Grandslam”. Main objective of the Pakistani thrust
was to cut off Kashmir supply line from the rest of the country by taking the
bridge at Akhnur.
As Pakistan
offensive with nearly 70 tanks and two infantry brigades crossed the IB towards
Indian Army forward positions at dawn of 01 September 1965, Indian Army was
completely outnumbered and asked for air support at 1100 hrs. So far both
countries had not declared war and hence use of Air Force had to be cleared only
by the Cabinet. Defence Minister gave the approval at close to 1800 hrs and
first formation of Vampires of four aircraft lead by Sqn Ldr SK Dahar took off from
Pathankot at 1719 hours. Two more formations armed with rockets and guns took
to air at interval of 10 minutes each with last formation attacking the enemy
positions at fading light.
Vampires
pounced on Pakistani armour with rockets and guns doing repeated attacks
unmindful of intense ground fire and possible air threat from Pakistan Air
Force (PAF). Second Vampire formation was bounced by a pair of PAF F 86 Sabres.
Faced with threat from a superior aircraft the right action for the obsolete
Vampires should have been to hit the deck and get out of the area at the fastest.
However, from account now available from a PAF Sabre pilot including of a gun
camera photo taken from his aircraft, it has been confirmed that far from
running away, Vampires tried to give a fight to the Sabres. In the completely
uneven duel, three gallant Indian pilots lost their lives.
Vampires
were followed by Mysteres into the battle area. In this very first action by IAF
in 1965 war it claimed 13 tanks, 2 guns and 62 soft-skinned vehicles destroyed
and most importantly IAF was able to prevent a major Pakistani breakthrough.
Tuskers raid Peshawar: Indo-Pak War 1965
This is an account of a few audacious
Canberra crews who flew almost 600 NMs into the enemy territory at night,
trailing one another at near medium levels without any escort and without any
radar cover, to bomb a very formidable airbase of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in
1965 war with Pakistan.
Unlike IAF in 1965, PAF with its US built F
104 Starfighters equipped with Sidewinder AIM 9B missile had night intercept
capability and vintage Canberras practically were sitting ducks against this supersonic,
state of the art interceptor. PAF also was fortunate to receive from US an
effective radar chain for early warning purposes. Against this background,
planning a mission to Peshawar for Canberras was suicidal as it entailed flying to a target at its
extreme flying range, through the enemy heartland with no allowance of fuel for
any tactical routing. Fuel constraint also meant limited payload.
Attacking Peshawar became important for India
as PAF had moved bulk of its attack force to its rear airfields and almost the
entire B 57 ac bomber force was shifted to Peshawar immediately after IAF
carried out retaliatory strikes on most of PAF bases with its Hunters and
Mysteres on 07 Sep 1965. PAF considered Peshawar to be outside the range of
Indian strike aircraft and hence a safe haven for its strategic force of US
made B 57 long range bombers. Yet, as night fell at Peshawar on 13 September
1965, 08 (Eight) Canberras of 5 Squadron stealthily approached Peshawar. The
typical profile of a Canberra raid was to approach to a pre –calculated pull up
point between 200 and 500 ft AGL, pull up steeply to about 12,000 feet to drop
the load and then climb progressively to 40,000 ft, to escape from Pakistani
territory.
As Canberras closed in to their
target, the ack -ack batteries opened up signaling raiders have been detected.
PAF pilots and ground crew ran to take shelter in trenches and they had the
rare privilege of seeing the first Canberra drop flares to illuminate the
airfield and then thunder down the main runway at 200 feet, before pulling up
at its end in an wingover to turn back and drop its bomb load at the end of a
dispersal of parked aircraft. Had luck favoured the Tuskers, they would have
wiped out the entire strategic strike component of the PAF with a single blow
as the entire force of sixteen B 57s were lined up wingtip to wingtip on a
dispersal. Unfortunately for IAF, the single 4000 lb bomb that fell closest to
the parked B 57s hit soft soil and its explosive force was dissipated. However,
bombs dropped from other members of Tusker force found their marks as fuel
dumps were set ablaze, ATC building was flattened and aircraft on ground were
damaged.
As Canberras set course for home,
the inevitable happened. A lone Starfighter was vectored for an intercept on to
the retreating bomber force. Canberras did all that was possible to do to
prevent a massacre. Sqn Ldr Gautam saw a streak of flame appear in the darkness
and made its way towards the bombers as the Starfighter launched its missile.
However, luck favored the brave and the missile exploded harmlessly, possibly due
to its proximity fuze malfunctioning. All eight Canberras landed safely at
Agra.
The raid shook the PAF out of its
complacency. No airfield or town was out of range of Indian bombers. No one in
Pakistan had thought that the IAF would bomb Peshawar with impunity. The raid
also forced the Americans (USAF), that had
maintained a full- fledged Signal Intelligence base about 20 miles South
of Peshawar, to evacuate all its
personnel with families through Iran and return only after cessation of hostilities.
Tuskers raid of Peshawar will
certainly go down as one of most audacious bomber attack in history of military
aviation. The significance of the raid was a symbolic gesture, less material
damage. Even John Fricker, the PAF
commissioned hagiographer was moved to an effusive turn of phrase in describing
the raid as, ‘the most effective Canberra attack of the war’.
The real heroes of the raid were
undoubtedly the Navigators whose chances of survival without an ejection seat
for them in Canberras were very close to nothing. It is, therefore, rightly so that Navigators
Sqn Ldr SN Bansal and Flt Lt P Dastidar were awarded Vir Chakras for their acts
of exceptional gallantry and Commanding Officer Wg Cdr PP Sing was decorated
with a Mahavir Chakra, country’s second highest gallantry award. Other members of the raid were Sqn Ldr JC Verma (Leader), Flt Lt Deshpande,
Wg Cdr PP Singh, Sqn Ldr CR Mehta, Sqn Ldr VC Godwin, Navigators Ahluwalia and
S Kapoor.
My painting “Tuskers raid Peshawar”
was inspired by the account I read in the book “The India-Pakistan Air War of
1965” by Jagan/Samir duo. So it was initially composed entirely on
impressions created in my mind of the attack as it was narrated in the
book. I was very fortunate to have
received more inputs from Capt Vivian Goodwin who was one of the members of
this fateful raid of 1965 war. I am also glad that Canberra gang of veterans
has appreciated my painting. I am told that they are an extremely close knit
lot and thick as thieves. It was wonderful to interact with few of them through
e mail and very sincerely hope the painting evokes some memory for those remaining
‘Few good men’ of 5 Squadron and JBCU of September 1965.
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